Abstract-XML access control is a non-trivial topic as XML language becomes a standard for data representation and transmission on the Web. Existing access control approaches to the published XML documents are not likely to scale well since they specify and enforce their access control policies in centralized servers. This paper proposed a distributed model for providing a scalable access control to the published XML documents. The proposed model is cost-effectively distributed for meeting the increased workload along with avoiding the possible bottlenecks. As a result, the proposed model effectively scales with the increased system and management workloads.
I. INTRODUCTION Extensible Markup Language (XML) is defined by World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) as a standard for data representation and transmission on the Web. The disseminated XML documents on the Web may contain a secret data that must be protected from ineligible access so XML access control is an important issue in Web information security [1] .
The early access control solutions, which were proposed for the traditional databases, faces new requirements if they are directly applied to XML documents [2] . Since the XML document has a hierarchal structure constructed from nested elements that can be described using a schema such as Document Type Definition (DTD) or XML Schema. In other words, XML access control must support [2, 3, 4] granularity levels in both XML document as well as schema.
A comprehensive XML access control system includes two parts [2] a policy specification and enforcement. The policy enforcement specifies access control policies that specify which user can execute which operation on which document portion (element or a set of elements). The policy enforcement enforces the specified access control policies during delivering the document to users.
The existing XML access control approaches are classified based on their policy enforcement into two categories [2, 5] : pull-based and push-based (or publish-subscribe) approaches. In the pull-based approaches, a server receives a request from a client 978-1-4244-2313-2/08/$25.00 ©2008 IEEE and responds with an appropriate view. While, in the push-based approaches, the server periodically encrypts the document portions with different keys and then publishes the encrypted document to all users; In addition, distributes the keys to users in a way that each user only receives the keys for portions that she is authorized to access.
Several push-based XML access control approaches have been proposed in [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . These approaches are unlikely able to scale well with the increased scale (in terms of users, policies, documents, keys, etc...) as they specify and enforce their access control policies in centralized servers, in which the increased scale strains the ability of both access control system and management to effectively handle the increased workload [11] .
In order to provide a scalable access control, the policy specification and enforcement must be distributed into different servers and managed in a decentralized management, while specifying the access control policies in such a way that it is easily and securely distributed between the interacted systems and administrators [11] .
The first attempt for decentralizing the management workload to several managers is proposed in [5] but it still has a negative result [12] on its scalability since the data is stored in a centralized server.
Moreover, in push-based XML access control, the policies related to each user must be selected and distributed for enabling the user to only decrypt the related encrypted portions. But, the policies distribution is a complex task because all the policies, related to all users, are specified in the same XML-based file(s) and stored in a secure centralized server. So, distributing the updated/new policies to users requires generating a view for each user, and then protecting this view for ensuring its integrity and authenticity.
Since XML document is becoming a standard for data exchanging on the Web, therefore proposing a scalable XML access control is a crucial needed for addressing the network effects [11] , which is means here meeting the increased number of the specified policies, subscribed users, and published documents attracted by increasing the number of the provided services.
Nowadays, the scalable access control solutions securely decentralize the access control system and management using the identity-based or credentialbased concepts. The identity-based concept is introduced in [13] , in which the user credential binds the user name and access rights. While the credential-based concept is introduced in [14] , in which the user credential binds the user public key and access rights; as a result the credential-based approaches provide a scalable solution compared to the identity-based approaches, this because user credential, in credential-based approaches, can be used for both authenticating and authorizing the user [11] . Applying these approaches to XML access control is not widely investigated. To the best of our knowledge, only in [15] a distributed XML access model is proposed which only supports the pull-based document dissemination mode.
In this paper, we proposed a distributed pushbased XML access control model that effectively works with the increased scale by distributing the system and management workloads to different components (or servers) and several administrators, respectively. Moreover, proposing a policy specification language for specifying access control policies that can be easily and securely managed and distributed. The policy enforcement is not widely considered in this paper.
The rest of this paper starts with an overview to the proposed model architecture in Section 2 followed by presenting a policy language in Section 3. Then, the whole model architecture is presented in Section 4 and Section 5. Finally, a discussion and conclusion are presented in Section 6 and Section 7, consequentially.
II. METHODOLOGY
The methodology of this paper is proposing a policy specification language is for decentralizing the management workload to several trusted administrators. Then, the model architecture is distributed into several servers by exploiting the distributed Client/server architecture as shown in Fig. 1 . Fig. 1 The overall model architecture In addition, a symmetric (secret) cryptography is used by this paper for encrypting the published document portions. Also, an asymmetric (public key) cryptography is used for digitally signing the distributed policies and published document along with securely distributing the secret encryption keys to the right users.
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III. TRUST-BASED XML POLICY LANGUAGE
In this paper, we proposed a policy XML specification language for specifying access control that can be easily and securely distributed between the interacted components, administrators, and users.
The proposed policy language is based on the trust management concept introduced by Blaze et aI., [14] . The trust management idea [16] is decentralizing the access control management over the responsible administrators. In addition, the trust management provides several features that increase the access control scalability [17] , these features are: combining the authentication and authorizations steps together; specifying expressible and extensible access control policies; distributing the policy specification and enforcement; and supports access delegation.
The proposed policy language specifies the access control policies based on the basic role-based access control (RBACo) model [18] as shown in Fig.  2 . Where, there are several RBAC models discussed in [18] . The RBACo (Fig. 2a) is used here because it is the most suitable RBAC model for the push-based access control. In other words, the other RBAC models, including the standard NIST RBAC model [19] , have Sessions components which assign each connected user to his data using an access session. While in push-based access control access, the access session is not required at all as the data is encrypted and published to all users at the same time.
The RBACo model specifies the minimum requirements for any fully RBAC system [18] . As shown in Fig. 2a , the RBACo model has three main elements and two main many-to-many relation-sets. The main elements are Users, Roles, and Permissions. The two main relation-sets are Userassignment (UA) and Permissions-assignment (PA). Moreover, the PERMs (Permissions) element encapsulates Objects and Operations elements related using a many-to-many relation-set.
As shown in Fig. 2 , the proposed policy language maps the RBACo elements and relation-sets into three policy certificates, which are:
• Permission certificate: Specifies a single permission.
• Role certificate: Specifies a single role and its assigned permissions. • User certificate: Specifies a single user along with his assigned roles and public key. The above three policy certificates (user, role, and permission certificates) have a defined structure using XML Schema. Where, the details of these certificates are presented by the following subsections. 
A. Permission Certificate
Basically, the permission specifies the operations that can be executed on objects. As shown in Fig. 3 , the permission certificate contains the administrator signature and permission specification in
subelements, respectively. The administrator signature is generated by digitally signing the "Permission" subelement only.
<?xml version=" 1.0" encoding="UTF- In "Permission" subelement, the nodes (objects as document portions) are specified using their XPath expressions so they can be granularity elements in XML document or XML schema.
Only a read operation is considered so it is applied by default to all nodes. The read operation is enough to be considered because in push-based access control the publisher mainly concerns in which nodes that the user can read (or decrypt) while the write operation is considered only when a collaborative authorized update is provided for a group of users as in proposed in [5] ~where this topic is outside the scope of this paper.
B. Role Certificate
The role is assigned to a set of permissions identified using the serial number of their certificates, as shown in Fig. 4 . Since the permission contains a set of nodes and the role is assigned to a set of permissions so, as a result, the role is seem also as a set of nodes. Fig. 4 shows an example of the role certificate which also contains both administrator signature and role specification.
<?xml version=" 1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <Role_Certificate> <Signature> <Issuer>policy manager I</Issuer> <Dig_Signature>null</Dig_Signature> </Signature> <Role> <Role_Name>DBs_Security</Role Name> <Permissions_Assig> -<Permission SN>P6</Permission SN> <Permission SN>P I</Permission -SN> <Permission= SN>P 16</Permissio~SN> 
C. User Certificate
The user certificate combines both the user public key and registered role as shown in Fig. 5 . The result is that the user certificate can be used during authenticating and authorizing the user.
The user certificate (Fig. 5 ) also contains the administrator signature and user credential in "Signature" and "Credential" subelements, respectively. The user is subscribed to one or more roles and each registered role is associated with a delegation attribute that specifies whither the user can delegate this role to another users and the number of the available delegations.
IV. THE DISTRIBUTED PUBLISHER
The overall architecture of the proposed model has two parts publisher and user. As shown in Fig. 6 , the publisher is distributed to four components (or servers), connected using a local LAN network, which are:
• Gateway dispatcher: Receives the requests of users and dispatches these requests to the responsible component. 
B. Policy Management
The policy management manages XML source, permissions certificates, and roles certificates. The XML source contains: well-formed; and valid XML documents with their schemas. The revoked roles and permissions certificates are added to roles certificates revocation list (RCRL) and permissions certificates revocations list (PCRL), respectively.
Periodically, the policy management distributes the new/updated documents, permissions certificates, roles certificates, RCRL, and PCRL to the enforcement engine to be used during the document encryption. Also, the new/updated roles and RCRL are distributed to the gateway dispatcher to be known during the user subscription process.
C. Subscription Engine
The subscription engine manages the certificates of users along with the public/private keys of the subscribed users and responsible administrators. The users certificates are generated by digitally signing the user subscription information, received from the gateway dispatcher, with a secret master key.
As each user certificate has a limited lifetime, which is the user access period. So, the subscription engine can periodically check and remove the expired users access certificates. Unlike the permissions and roles certificates, here it is clear that there is no need for distributing an users certificates revocation list from the subscription engine to the enforcement engine. This because, the enforcement engine can also check and remove the expired users access certificates as each user access certificate has a limited lifetime included inside the certificate itself.
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A. Gateway Dispatcher
The gateway dispatcher represents the publisher interface to users. In other words, the gateway dispatcher task is receiving the requests of users~nd dispatching these requests to the correspondIng components. The user request can be a subscription or download request. The subscription request (subscribe, unsubscribe, modify subscription, or delegate access) is dispatched to the subscription engine. While the download request (for recovering the lost published document or access certificate) is dispatched to the enforcement engine.
The gateway dispatcher also balances the load of the requests between the available replicated components using a software-based balancing approach. The user requests the system via the gateway dispatcher's IP address or URL. Then, the gateway dispatcher rewrite the request packets by replacing its IP address or URL with the IP address of the component that will exactly process the request and send the response to user.
D. Enforcement Engine
The enforcement engine enforces access control policies, included inside the policy certificates, over XML document by the following steps:
• The nodes related to a specific role are filtered to a new document. Then, the filtered document is encrypted with a secret (symmetric) key.
• The secret keys are encrypted using a key broadcasting schema. This schema ensures that each user obtains only the right secret keys.
• The encrypted filtered documents and secret keys are packaged together, digitally signed with the private key of enforcement engine or its administrator, and published to all users.
v. THE SUBSCRIBED USER
At the subscription user client, the received package is first verified with the public key of the enforcement engine's administrator who signed the published package. After that the user decrypts the encrypted secret keys of the registered role with his private key. Then, the user related nodes are decrypted with the appropriate secret keys.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this section, the proposed model, including the proposed trust-based XML policy language, is evaluated using a qualitative evaluation method. Since, the quantitative method requires determining the used public key and keys broadcasting schemas. These two schemas are related to each others and the broadcasting schema is not considered by this paper.
The proposed policy language and distributed model architecture are evaluated in the following two subsections, respectively.
A. Policy Language Evaluation
The proposed trust-based XML policy language provides several advantages that help on designing a scalable push-based XML access control system and management. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first policy language proposed for push-based XML access control and its provided advantages are not addressed by the related works.
In the following subsections, the proposed policy language advantages to both access control system and management are discussed.
1) Management Scalability Features:
The proposed policy language provides the access control management with several features, which all improve the management scalability [11, 12, 17] . These features are:
• Separation of Duties: This feature improves the management scalability [11] by separating the management workload to several administrators. As shown in Fig. 2 , the proposed policy language achieved this feature based on the RBAC model and by separating the users from their permissions using the roles. Therefore, the users, permissions, and roles certificates can be separately managed by different administrators.
• Authorities Delegation: The authority of managing the users, permissions, or roles certificates can be delegated to more than one administrator. This because each issued certificate is attached with the administrator identity and signature. So, the certificate issuer is authenticated and non-repudiated.
• Extensibility: The policy certificates can be also specified in remote, different applications, and then copied to the local application.
2) System Scalability Features: Using the proposed policy language, the access control system is provided with several features that increased [11, 12, and 17] the system ability to scales with the increased number of users, as the following:
• A policy distribution is simplified as only the user certificate is distributed to user. Instead of generating and distributing both the user credential and related policies as in the related models. This because the proposed policy language decouples the user credentials (certificate) from the access control policies (permissions) as discussed in Section 3.
• The user certificate is used for both authenticating and authorizing the user requests. Since the user certificate contains the user public key and registered roles. Unlike the related works used identity-based which needs resolving the user, and this approach are not unlikely to scale well with a large number of user.
• A decentralized subscription is provided, as the subscription engine can be distributed and replicated to meet the required scale of users' subscription requests.
• A distributed enforcement also can be provided. This means, the enforcement engine can be distributed and replicated. So, the increased number of users can be grouped into more than one enforcement engine.
B. The Distributed Model Evaluation
Since our scaling strategy is distributing the increased workload to different, replicated components, the proposed model is evaluated using two different, but related, criteria used in [20, 21] :
• First, we discuss whether our model distribution is a cost-effective strategy.
• Then, we determine any found bottlenecks and show how they can be avoided if any.
1) The Model Cost-effectiveness:
This criterion measures whether distributing the model is a costeffective for increasing the model scalability. A cost-effective distributed model is the model that can be dynamically changed [20] . So, we discuss if the proposed distributed model can be dynamically changed according to the required scale.
The proposed model is distributed to four different components which are gateway dispatcher, policy management, subscription engine, and enforcement engine. The gateway dispatcher is the only component that is executed in one dedicated machine. While the last three components can be flexibly executed based on the required scale and as in the following cases:
• They can be executed in one machine as different applications. These applications share the same IP address and have different port addresses.
• If the increased workload strains the scalability of any application, then this application can be executed in a separated machine (here the component is distributed).
• Also, each distributed component can be replicated (or extended) by executing it in several machines. The policy management, subscription engine, and enforcement engine are differently replicated. The policy management can be replicated or its parts (XML source, roles, and permissions) are distributed to different machines. The subscription engine is normally replicated to several machines and their load is balanced by the gateway dispatcher. While the enforcement engine is replicated based on the number of users, this means each replicated enforcement engine machine is assigned to a group of users.
As result, the proposed model is cost-effectively distributed to scales with the increased workload along with increasing the availability and flexibility.
2) The Model Bottlenecks: Based on our scaling strategy, the bottlenecks that can be found in the proposed model are [20] :
• Management bottlenecks • Centralized resources bottlenecks • User communication bottleneck • Performance bottlenecks The above possible bottlenecks are discussed in the following subsections, consequently.
The management bottlenecks are happened when the management workload is increased faster than the system workload [20] . Since in the proposed model the increased system workload caused distributing/replicating the subscription engine, policy management, and enforcement engine, therefore we discuss the implications of the distributed/replicated these components on the management workload, as the following:
• Since the subscription engine processes the received subscription requests automatically so a single administrator can manage a workstation of several replicated subscription engines.
• Also, one administrator can manage a workstation of several enforcement engines as the administrator only (periodically) runs the publishing algorithm which then performs the publishing of the encrypted document and secret keys to all users. • In the policy management, there are no management bottlenecks as the XML source, roles, and permissions can be separately distributed and replicated, also they can be robustly specified. Moreover, the policy management does not have any online or offline connection with users. As a result, there are no management bottlenecks in our model and the management workload grows slower than the system workload.
In the proposed distributed model, the distributed/replicated components do not have to share any centralized resources. For example, replicating the subscription engine requires only recopying the master key and any other security parameters to each replicated component. Also, replicating the enforcement engine needs only replicating the appropriate policy certificates.
The bottlenecks on the user communication happened when the user processed and transmitted data size is increased as the system workload increased [20] .
So, we consider only the bottlenecks on online user and model interactions.
With the subscription requests, the system processes and transmits the same data size (a pair of public/private key and user certificate) for each user. Moreover, because the user certificate is separately specified so it is directly distributed to user without distributing the certificates of the registered roles and their related permissions, unlike the related works which specified the credentials of all users in one file and distributes the user credential along with the related permissions because the nodes and their XPaths expressions must be known to users.
While with the download requests, the system distributes the same existed publishing package to all requested users without any additional processing.
Also, bottlenecks are happened when the system workload is increased, which increases the response time, and the user may refine the same request many times. As a result, the size of the processed and transmitted data is increased. Our model addresses this issue by the gateway dispatcher which informing the user about his waiting time, based on the workload of the responsible component. The gateway dispatcher also filters the resubmitted request and informs the user that he already has a request under processing.
The performance of our model is widely based on the used public key schema and key broadcasting schemas. Both policy management and enforcement engines are not likely to face any computational overhead since they perform an administrative and a periodically works, respectively. So, the system performance on processing the requests of users is only discussed here.
Mostly, the subscription requests involve four operations: authenticating the user, authorizing the user, generating user public/private key, and signing the user certificate. While the download requests involve two operations authenticating and authorizing the user. In our model, the user certificate combines both user public key and roles so verifying the requested user signature (authentication) and deciding his rights (authorization) are done with only known the user certificate.
VII.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a scalable push-based XML access control model. The scaling strategy used in this paper is distributing the increased system and management workloads to different servers and several administrators, respectively. Also, a trust-based policy language is proposed for specifying access control policies in decentralized trust management.
The proposed distributed model was evaluated using a qualitative evaluation method which shows that the proposed model is scalable since it's costeffectively distributed to meet the required scale and avoids the visible bottlenecks.
As a further work that we are now working with is improving the scalability of push-based XML access control by reducing the system update and policy enforcement costs. Also, our policy language can be extended for supporting the access delegation from one administrator to another or from one level to lower level.
